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Abstract 
This  paper  examines  how  the  effect  of  education  on  institutional  trust  varies  cross-
nationally  as  a  function  of  the  pervasiveness  of  public-sector  corruption.    We  approach 
institutional  trust  as  a  performance-based  evaluation  of  political  institutions.  Given  their 
greater  capacity  to  accurately  assess  the  level  of  corruption  coupled  with  their  stronger 
commitment to democratic values, we hypothesize that higher educated citizens should react 
differently to corruption from those with less education.  Employing multilevel models we find 
that education has both a conditional and a conditioning effect on institutional trust. First, 
education is negatively related to institutional trust in corrupt societies and positively related to 
institutional trust in clean societies. Second, corruption’s corrosive effect on institutional trust 
worsens as education improves.  The paper ends with a discussion of the implications of these 
findings for the functioning of contemporary democracies.   1
Why are citizens in some countries more trusting of the actors and institutions of government 
than citizens in other countries?  Over the past two decades this question has come to occupy 
an important place in the field of comparative political science (Dalton, 2004; Norris 1999a; 
Pharr and Putnam, 2000).  In the large body  of work that now exists on this question of 
political trust, a contradictory set of findings regarding the effect of education has gone largely 
unnoticed.  Whereas some research shows that education boosts political trust (e.g., Anderson 
and Singer, 2008), in other work the effect of education is negative (e.g., Seligson, 2002); and 
in a third group of studies, education fails altogether to predict individual-level variation in 
political trust (e.g., Mishler and Rose, 2001).  Interestingly, specialists of political behavior 
have puzzled over the same variability of the effect of education on electoral participation 
(Verba et al., 1978; Powell, 1986; Gallego, 2010).  These authors show that this inconsistency 
of the effect of education on turnout is attributable to variation at the macro level.  In a similar 
vein, we argue that the direction and magnitude of the effect of education on institutional trust 
depends on a country’s political and institutional context.
1 
At  the  heart  of  our  study  lie  the  following  two  propositions.    First,  citizens  grant  and 
withhold trust based on their evaluation of the performance of the actors and institutions of 
government.  Second, citizens with more education are not only more likely to be better able to 
identify practices that undermine the smooth functioning of democratic institutions, they are 
also more likely to be normatively troubled by such practices.  Based on these twin claims, we 
hypothesize that political trust is determined by the interactive effect of a person’s level of 
education on the one hand and the overall quality of their country’s system of democratic 
governance on the other.  
                                                 
1  An  online  appendix  with  supplementary  material  will  be  available  after  publication  of  the  article  at 
https://journals.cambridge.org/jop.  The data used in this paper are accessible at http://ess.nsd.uib.no/ess/round4.  
Supporting  materials  necessary  to  reproduce  the  numerical  results  will  be  made  available  at 
www.quintonmayne.net upon publication.   2
Using data from 21 European democracies, where system performance is operationalized 
using a measure of public-sector corruption, the results of our analyses strongly support a 
cross-level, interactive understanding of political trust.  In countries with comparatively high 
levels of corruption, we  find that education  dampens  political trust; in countries with low 
levels  of  corruption,  education  actually  boosts  political  trust.    Moreover,  our  study  also 
demonstrates that the effect of corruption on political trust depends on educational attainment.  
Specifically, we find that citizens with the lowest levels of education are unresponsive to the 
effects of corruption; for all other citizens, the corrosive effects of corruption on political trust 
increase with education. 
In contrast to existing work that examines the interactive effects of education on public 
opinion  and  political  behavior,  we  go  beyond  a  purely  cognitive  conception  of  education 
(Huber et al., 2005; Krause, 1997; Jacoby, 1991; Nagler, 1991).  We posit that education not 
only facilitates the acquisition and processing of information, it also fundamentally informs 
how citizens react to certain types of information.  Thus, a key innovation of this study is that 
in specifying our hypotheses we are sensitive as much to the normative as to the knowledge-
enhancing  properties  and  effects  of  education.    This  theoretical  refinement  challenges  the 
common proposition that rising levels of education have been responsible for declines in a 
variety of forms of political support observed in many advanced industrial democracies over 
the past half century (Dalton, 2004, pp. 86-91; Inglehart, 1999, pp. 245-256).  What we show 
is that there is nothing about education per se that should encourage institutional distrust.  
Ultimately the role played by the improving educational profile of contemporary societies is to 
bring into striking and at times alarming relief the overall democratic quality of a country’s 
processes of government. 
In  the  next  section  we  discuss  the  concept  of  institutional  trust  as  an  evaluative, 
performance-based orientation toward political actors and institutions.  We then elaborate the 
accuracy- and norm-inducing role played by education in this process of evaluation, which   3
results  in citizens granting  or withholding political trust depending on the quality  of their 
country’s system of governance.  The following section describes the data and methods that we 
use to estimate this micro-macro interactive model of political trust.  After presenting the 
results of this model, we discuss the importance and implications of our findings both for the 
study of political trust and for the functioning of democracy more generally. 
Theory 
Institutional Trust 
In the course of their lives citizens are vulnerable to the decisions and actions of a myriad of 
political actors and institutions.  Political trust refers to the faith that citizens place in political 
actors and institutions not to act in ways that will do them harm (Levi and Stoker, 2000; 
Newton, 1999).  Objects of political trust can range from the abstract to the very specific 
(Norris, 1999b).  Forming a mid-range object of trust are political institutions, examples of 
which include local government, the civil service, the legal system, parties, parliament, the 
police, judges, and politicians.  Lying at the very heart of contemporary democratic life and 
following a long line of research from comparative political behavior, we focus on public trust 
in this category of political institutions and actors. 
Over the years a number of compelling arguments and empirical findings have been put 
forward in support of the study of institutional trust.  Most fundamentally, institutional trust 
has commonly been conceived of as a democratic good in and of itself as well as an important 
gauge of a democracy’s political health (Dalton, 2004; Pharr and Putnam, 2000).  A number of 
studies have also argued that a public’s trust in the actors and institutions of political authority 
facilitates democratic consolidation in that institutionally-trusting individuals have been found 
to be more supportive of democratic principles (Seligson and Carrión, 2002).  In addition, 
existing  research  underscores  the  importance  of  institutional  distrust  as  a  determinant  of 
political  participation,  especially  non-electoral  participation  such  as  protest  activity  and   4
political consumerism (Mishler and Rose, 2005; Micheletti et al., 2003).  More recent research 
has also shown how institutional trust is related to a range of key political and non-political 
attitudes, including public policy preferences (Chanley et al., 2000; Hetherington, 2005) and 
trust  in  fellow  citizens  (Zmerli  and  Newton,  2008).    Finally,  several  studies  have  drawn 
attention  to  the  positive  relationship  between  institutional  trust  and  compliance  with 
government regulation and civic duty (Letki, 2006; Tyler, 1990). 
Building  on  existing  theoretical  and  empirical  research  from  the  field  of  comparative 
political  behavior,  we  understand  institutional  trust  within  a  “rationalist”  framework  as  a 
primarily  evaluative  orientation  (Hetherington,  1998;  Mishler  and  Rose,  2001).    Thus,  in 
contrast  to  “culturalist”  understandings  of  institutional  (dis)trust  as  deeply  socio-culturally 
embedded, we view institutional trust as a product of individual-level judgment regarding the 
performance of political institutions and actors.  Borrowing the conceptual approach developed 
with regard to the European Union by Fritz Scharpf (1999), we propose that citizens evaluate 
political  institutions  and  actors  based  on  two  different  sets  of  performance  criteria:  those 
related  to  “input”  or  procedural  performance  and  those  related  to  “output”  or  policy 
performance.   
Procedural  performance  is  synonymous  with  the  long-standing  democratic  adage  of 
government by the people.  Citizens judge procedural performance according to the extent to 
which the democratic promise of political fairness and equality is made real by the rules, 
procedures,  norms,  and  structures  that  guide  and  constrain  the  functioning  of  political 
institutions and the behavior of political actors.  Policy performance, on the other hand, is 
synonymous with the notion of government for the people.  As such, citizens evaluate policy 
performance  based  on  substantive  considerations  concerning  how  successful  political 
institutions and actors are in implementing policies and providing services that are responsive 
to the public’s preferences and priorities.  Where political actors and institutions achieve high 
levels of procedural and policy performance, we anticipate citizens will reward such positive   5
performance with trust.  In contrast, we expect citizens to express low levels of institutional 
trust  where  the  actors  and  institutions  of  democratic  political  authority  perform  poorly 
procedurally and in terms of policy responsiveness. 
This  idea  that  institutional  trust  is  fundamentally  the  product  of  a  performance-based 
evaluation finds a great deal of support in the sizeable body of work that has examined the 
effects of public-sector corruption on attitudes related to political support.  Time and again we 
see  the  corrosive  effects  of  corruption  on  people’s  trust  in  the  actors  and  institutions  of 
government (Anderson and Tverdova, 2003; Chang and Chu, 2006; Mishler and Rose, 2001; 
Seligson, 2002).  What this literature highlights is that corruption undermines political trust in 
a number of different ways.  On the one hand, it affects the procedural performance of political 
institutions; on the other hand, corruption  makes  it extremely difficult for governments  to 
produce policies and services that are responsive to the general public (Rothstein and Uslaner, 
2005; Warren, 2004).   
 
Accuracy- and norm-inducing functions of education  
In  defining  the  concept  of  institutional  trust  and  describing  the  process  of  performance 
evaluation behind it, we have painted an undifferentiated picture of citizens.  When it comes to 
the  process  of  performance  evaluation  undergirding  institutional  trust,  there  are  sound 
theoretical  and  empirical  reasons  to  think  about  citizens  in  heterogeneous  rather  than 
homogeneous terms (Anderson and Singer, 2008).  Specifically, we propose that citizens will 
assess and react to the general performance of their respective country’s political institutions 
differently depending on their level of education.  This idea that education plays a pivotal role 
is based on an abundance of evidence identifying the deep imprint left by education both on 
citizens’ capacity to acquire and process information and on the types of values and principles   6
citizens hold dear.  For simplicity’s sake, we will refer to these as the accuracy-inducing and 
norm-inducing functions of education.
2 
Any act of evaluation requires a capacity to acquire and process information related to the 
object being evaluated.  For the present purposes the object of evaluation is the performance of 
political institutions.  Single-country and comparative research has demonstrated that, even 
after controlling for a host of other variables, formal education produces a number of different 
and oftentimes related changes in individuals that facilitate the acquisition and processing of 
information necessary for arriving at an accurate assessment of the functioning of political 
institutions.  For one, education has repeatedly been shown to have a positive effect on the 
amount and type of attention citizens pay to politics and public affairs.  For example, the more 
educated consistently express more interest in politics than the less educated (Delli Carpini and 
Keeter, 1996; Verba et al., 1995).  Education has been shown to be positively related to time 
spent reading newspapers, itself an important means of obtaining political information (Dee, 
2004; Elvestad and Blekesaune, 2008; Shehata and Strömbäck, 2011).  Moreover, citizens with 
higher levels of education have a greater tendency to undertake a range of political activities 
that provide opportunities for learning about the quality of political institutions.  This includes, 
for instance, attending public meetings, making contact with public officials, and following 
electoral campaigns (Aars and Strømsnes, 2007; Milligan et al., 2004; Pattie et al., 2004). 
A large body of research also underscores the important direct and indirect role played by 
formal education in enhancing political knowledge.  The more educated are more likely to 
respond correctly to questions of fact related to the key players and workings of their political 
system  (Hyman  et  al.,  1975;  Delli  Carpini  and  Keeter,  1996;  Milner  2002).    The  more 
educated have also been shown to be better able to place parties on issues and ideology and 
more  likely  to  form  attitudes  consistent  with  their  own  ideological  leanings  (Aarts  and 
Semetko, 2003; Gordon and Segura, 1997; Jacoby, 1991).  Interestingly, there is also evidence 
                                                 
2 We thank one of our anonymous reviewers for suggesting this phrasing.   7
to  suggest  that,  compared  to  the  less  educated,  the  higher  educated  are  more  likely  to 
accurately assess their particular country’s overall respect for human rights (Anderson et al., 
2005). 
While education makes it easier for citizens to acquire and process information related to 
the  quality  of  the  workings  of  democratic  institutions,  there  is  nothing  intrinsic  about  the 
possession  of  such  information  that  should  lead  citizens  to  view  underperforming  or 
mismanaged  institutions  negatively.    In  order  to  hypothesize  about  this  link  between 
knowledge  and  evaluation  we  need  to  establish  how  citizens  react  to  information  about 
phenomena, such as corruption, that undermine democratic performance.  Education has long 
been shown to leave an indelible mark both on people’s broad normative proclivities and on 
the store they set by democratic rule.  For example, over the years research has repeatedly 
shown that support for a range of liberal moral values, including equality and tolerance, grows 
with years of schooling (Bobo and Licari, 1989; Hyman and Wright, 1979; Nie et al., 1996; 
Vogt, 1997).  Scholars have also argued that in established democracies the more educated are 
more likely to support and defend core democratic values and principles (Dalton, 1994, p. 483; 
Hibbing and Theiss-Morse, 2002, p.771; McClosky and Zaller, 1984, pp. 239-240).  In the past 
decade,  drawing  in  part  on  earlier  waves  of  modernization  research,  a  body  of  work  has 
emerged that also highlights the positive links between years of schooling and support for 
democracy in new democracies and non-democracies (Evans and Rose, 2007; Jamal, 2006; 
Kotzian, 2011).  Thus, in addition to being better able to accurately identify practices that 
undermine  the  smooth  functioning  of  democratic  institutions,  these  different  strands  of 
research suggest that the better educated will also be normatively troubled by such practices. 
As discussed earlier, corruption represents a major challenge to the performance of political 
institutions.  As such, and in view of the accuracy- and norm-inducing functions of education, 
when  faced  with  the  absence  or  presence  of  corruption  we  expect  citizens  to  grant  and 
withhold institutional trust differently depending on their level of education.  In other words,   8
we hypothesize that corruption and education interact to affect a person’s level of trust in 
political institutions.  In hypothesizing that such an interactive effect exists we are making two 
separate, symmetric claims (see Berry et al., 2007): one is about the conditional effect of 
education; the other is about the conditioning effect of education. 
 
Hypothesis  1:  Regarding  the  conditional  effect  of  education,  we  hypothesize  that  in 
countries with comparatively high levels of corruption more educated citizens will react more 
negatively to corruption than the less educated.  In contrast, in comparatively clean countries 
we  hypothesize  that  more  educated  citizens  will  react  more  positively  to  the  absence  of 
corruption than the less educated. 
 
Hypothesis 2: As for the conditioning effect of education on corruption, we envisage that 
while corruption will corrode institutional trust among all citizens irrespective of their level of 
education, the size of this negative effect of corruption on institutional trust should increase 
with a person’s level of education. 
   
In testing the first hypothesis we are able to address a long-standing but overlooked aspect 
of  existing  research  that  becomes  clear  from  surveying  important  single-country  and 
comparative  studies regarding  the effects  of education on political trust.  We can classify 
existing studies according to whether they examine individual-level variations in political trust 
in one or more advanced industrial democracy, in one or more of the new and/or low-, middle-, 
and high-income democracies of Central and Eastern Europe, Latin America, Africa, and Asia, 
or in a mix of old and new, low-, middle-, and high-income democracies (see Table A1 in the 
online appendix).  Of the existing research that is based on data from the world’s longest-
standing, advanced industrial democracies, many studies show a positive effect of education 
(e.g., Anderson et al., 2005; Rohrschneider and Schmitt-Beck, 2002), whereas only one study   9
shows education as having a negative effect on political trust (Cooke and Gronke, 2005).  In 
contrast, many studies show education as negatively related to political trust in the world’s 
newer and less affluent democracies (e.g., Chang and Chu, 2006; Canache and Allison, 2005).  
Moreover, equally  telling  is the fact that the effect of education on  political trust fails  to 
achieve statistical significance in a number of pieces of research using data from both old and 
new democracies (e.g., Anderson and Tverdova, 2003).  These contradictory findings suggest 
that  that  the  effect  of  education  on  institutional  trust  is  context  specific.    The  empirical 
analyses that follow demonstrate that this is indeed the case. 
Data and variables 
In  order  to  test  whether  institutional  trust  is  a  function  of  the  interaction  of  educational 
achievement and corruption, we make use of Round 4 of the European Social Survey (ESS) 
conducted in 2008-2009.  The necessary individual- and macro-level variables were available 
for  eight  Eastern  and  Central  European  and  13  Western  European  democracies:  namely, 
Belgium, Croatia, the Czech Republic, Denmark, Estonia, Finland, France, Germany, Great 
Britain,  Greece,  Hungary,  Latvia,  the  Netherlands,  Norway,  Poland,  Portugal,  Romania, 
Slovenia, Spain, Sweden, and Switzerland. This section outlines the key variables and data 
sources of our study.  The exact wording of the survey items can be found in the online 
appendix. 
 
Dependent variable 
Institutional trust constitutes the dependent variable of this study.  The ESS asks respondents 
about  their  levels  of  trust  in  their  country’s  parliament,  legal  system,  police,  politicians, 
political parties, the European Parliament, and the United Nations. Since our substantive focus 
is  on  domestic  institutions  and  their  respective  performance  we  chose  to  drop  trust  in 
international organizations such as the European Parliament and the United Nations from our   10
index.  We combine the remaining five items to create an index of institutional trust.
3  For our 
sample of 21 European democracies, Cronbach’s alpha, a widespread measure of reliability for 
scales, ranges from 0.83 in Poland to 0.92 in Romania.  These figures are well above the 
conventional  boundaries  for  scale  construction,  so  for  our  dependent  variable  we  simply 
calculate the mean score of these five separate domestic trust items.
4 
Institutional trust has a theoretical range of 0 (‘no trust at all’) to 10 (‘completely trusting’).  
The empirical, aggregate-level range runs from 2.78 in Latvia to 6.58 in Denmark (see Figure 
A1 in the online appendix).  We can divide the sample into roughly three sets of countries 
based on levels of institutional trust.  The first group of ‘highly trusting’ countries consists of 
Sweden, the Netherlands, Switzerland, Norway, Finland, and Denmark.  A second group of 
‘moderately trusting’ countries consists  of Slovenia, Estonia,  Spain,  France, Great Britain, 
Belgium, and Germany.  Finally, a third group of ‘low trusting’ countries consists of Latvia, 
Hungary,  Croatia,  Poland,  the  Czech  Republic,  Portugal,  Romania,  and  Greece.    As  this 
grouping makes clear, Central and Eastern European countries generally exhibit lower levels 
of  trust  than  their  Western  European  counterparts  (also  see  Mishler  and  Rose,  1997).  
However, while controlling for region is therefore important, there are noticeable exceptions to 
this pattern.  Portugal and Greece, for instance, are on average less trusting than Slovenia and 
Estonia.  Furthermore, there are stark within-region differences in institutional trust, so even 
after controlling for region sizeable variation in trust remains among the Western European 
and Central and Eastern European countries in our sample. 
 
 
 
                                                 
3 Klingemann (1999) and Anderson and  Singer (2008) adopt a  similar empirical  strategy  in their studies  of 
political trust. 
4 An index consisting of all seven trust items is virtually identical to the five-item index (Pearson’s r = 0.96), and 
employing it as the dependent variable does not alter any of the substantive results reported here.   11
Independent variables 
The two main independent variables are level of education and corruption.  For the former, we 
recoded the original ESS education item into four categories.  The lowest education category 
contains  those  respondents  with  no  qualification  or  only  primary  education  (16.0%  of  the 
entire sample).  The next category contains those with a lower secondary level of education 
(19.4%). The third category consists of individuals with an upper-secondary or post-secondary, 
(non-university)  education  (40.9%).    Finally,  the  highest  category  contains  those  with  a 
university education (23.7%).
5  
The  primary  macro-level,  contextual  variable  of  interest  is  corruption.  We  draw  upon 
Transparency International’s well-known Corruption Perception Index (CPI) which gauges the 
perceived level of public-sector corruption.  The CPI is a composite measure, consisting of 13 
items from 11 independent institutions, that  taps perceptions  of corruption among country 
experts and business leaders and has been employed in numerous other comparative studies of 
the causes and consequences of corruption (Treisman, 2000; Anderson and Tverdova, 2003; 
Gerring and Thacker, 2004).
6  Higher scores on the CPI indicate a relative lack of corruption in 
the  public  sector  and  political  sphere.    Using  data  for  2008,  the  CPI  ranges  from  9.3  in 
Denmark and Sweden to 3.8 in Romania.  The fact that the CPI is a measure of perceived 
corruption could raise questions of endogeneity, but Anderson and Tverdova (2003) employ a 
Hausman test to show that corruption is not endogenous to system support.  We therefore 
include the CPI as an explanatory variable with the knowledge that the CPI is exogenous to 
mass attitudes towards the political system. 
 
                                                 
5 We also conduct the analysis using the original seven-category education item from the ESS to check whether 
our results are sensitive to configurations of the education categories. The findings turn out to be similar.  
6  For  a  detailed  description  of  the  construction  of  the  Corruption  Perception  Index,  see 
http://www.transparency.org/policy_research/surveys_indices/cpi/2008.   12
Control variables 
Previous comparative studies have identified a host of individual-level factors besides level of 
education that predict political trust (Mishler and Rose, 2001; Chang and Chu, 2006; Anderson 
and Singer, 2008; Van Der Meer, 2010).  These include demographic and socio-economic 
variables such as age, gender, income, religious denomination, and religious attendance.  We 
also control for pre-adult experiences and influences by including paternal level of education 
(see Kam and Palmer, 2008).  Furthermore, we control for several attitudinal and behavioral 
variables that have been shown to be positively related to political trust, including social trust 
(Zmerli and Newton, 2008), election winner or loser status (Anderson and Tverdova, 2003), 
and  satisfaction  with  the  present  state  of  the  national  economy  (Mishler  and  Rose,  2001; 
Rohrschneider and Schmitt-Beck, 2002).
7 
At the country level, the control variables include level of development as captured by GDP 
per  capita,  level  of  unemployment,  and  a  region  dummy  for  Central  and  Eastern  Europe 
(Anderson and Singer, 2008).  Some scholars have made the argument that the inclusion of 
citizens into the political process induces more positive attitudes toward the political system 
(Lijphart, 1999).  We therefore add the disproportionality of the electoral system, as calculated 
by Gallagher’s least squares index (Gallagher, 1991), to our country-level controls. We refrain 
from  including  additional  country-level  controls  due  to  our  relatively  small  sample  of 
countries. 
Method 
A study of the link between macro-politics and micro-behavior calls for data collection at the 
level of individuals as well as countries.  Since individuals are nested within national contexts 
an  explicitly  multilevel  modeling  strategy  is  in  order  (Snijders  and  Bosker,  1999).  
                                                 
7 We note that some of these control variables might be endogenous to our dependent variable.  For example, 
Hetherington (1998) shows that political trust is an important cause of perceptions of presidential performance.   13
Steenbergen  and  Jones  (2002)  recommend,  as  a  first  step  toward  building  appropriate 
multilevel models, checking whether and to what extent the dependent variable in question 
varies  across  the  relevant  levels  of  analysis.  Applied  to  our  case,  we  should  investigate 
whether institutional trust varies between individual respondents as well as between countries. 
Figure 1 has already underlined the large between-country differences in institutional trust. 
What  therefore  remains  to  be  investigated  is  the  extent  to  which  this  variation  can  be 
accounted for by the characteristics of citizens in these specific countries or by macro-level 
characteristics specific to the countries themselves. 
Following  the  advice  of  Steenbergen  and  Jones  (2002),  we  decompose  the  variance  in 
institutional trust into individual-level variance and country-level variance such that 
 
Institutional trustij = γ00 + ν0j + εij              (1) 
 
Here, institutional trust varies around a grand mean γ00, while ν0j and εij capture deviations 
from  the  grand  mean  for  country  j  and  individual  i  respectively.    Since  both  variance 
components are statistically significant (see Table A2 in the online appendix), we can conclude 
that  there  appears  to  be  significant  variance  in  institutional  trust  at  both  levels  providing 
statistical justification for adopting a multilevel approach.  In addition, about 27 percent of the 
total  variance  in  institutional  trust  occurs  at  the  country-level,  so  by  ignoring  contextual 
variance one is likely to miss out on important explanations of institutional trust.  
We now specify a random-coefficient model that assesses the interactive effect of education 
and  corruption on institutional  trust,  while  controlling  for confounding factors at  both the 
individual and country levels.  At the individual level education takes the form of three dummy 
variables with the lowest education cohort functioning as the reference category.  The model 
contains  a  variance  component  for  the  intercept,  accounting  for  mean  differences  in 
institutional trust across countries, and for the education dummies, effectively allowing the   14
impact of education on political trust to vary across the 21 sampled democracies.  The variance 
estimates of the slopes are all statistically significant and increase in magnitude as education 
level increases.  The fact that education has a varying impact on institutional trust is of course 
the  focus  of  this  study.    A  cross-level  interaction  between  corruption  and  the  education 
categories then estimates the extent to which, on the one hand, the effect of education on 
institutional trust is contingent upon corruption, and on the other, the effect of corruption on 
institutional trust is contingent upon a person’s education.
8  The original intra-class correlation 
drops from 0.27 in the empty model to 0.17 when we allow the slopes to vary across countries 
and add individual-level controls.  This figure drops even further to 0.03 after introducing the 
country-level controls and the cross-level interactions, which underscores the importance of 
modeling institutional trust hierarchically.  
Empirical Findings 
As a preliminary test of our hypotheses, we plot mean levels of institutional trust among the 
highest and lowest educated in each of the 21 democracies in our sample.  Figure 1 displays 
these mean levels, with countries ranked according to their CPI score.  First, congruent with 
Hypothesis 1, the highest educated exhibit more political trust than the lowest educated, but 
only  when  corruption  is  low.    Figure  1  shows  that  education  boosts  political  trust  in  the 
countries towards the right-hand side of the graph.  The difference in trust between the highest 
and lowest educated disappears as corruption increases and even reverses toward the left-hand 
side of the graph.  In Romania, Croatia, Greece, and Latvia the least educated display higher 
levels of institutional trust than the most educated.  This graphical analysis lends tentative 
support to the hypothesis that the effect of education on institutional trust is not uniform across 
countries but rather depends on the context in which citizens are nested.  Second, in line with 
                                                 
8 Our dependent variable is normally distributed, so we use Maximum Likelihood to estimate a linear multilevel 
regression. All analyses were conducted using STATA 11.    15
Hypothesis  2,  institutional  trust  decreases  as  corruption  rises  both  among  the  highest  and 
lowest educated groups, but the decline is greatest among the highest educated.  Of course, as 
Figure 1 displays net effects of education on political trust, it remains to be seen whether these 
findings will be reproduced in a fully-specified hierarchical model.  To this we turn next.  
 
INSERT FIGURE 1 
 
Table 1 presents the estimation results from our random coefficients model.  Before moving on 
to our main findings, however, we note that institutional trust is positively related to paternal 
education, income, religious attendance, and belonging to a religion, and negatively related to 
age and being male.  In addition, several indicators of civic and political engagement have a 
positive effect on institutional trust.  People who are more trusting of other people are also 
more likely to exhibit institutional trust compared to less socially trusting individuals (Zmerli 
and Newton, 2008).  Moreover, those who evaluate the state of the economy more positively 
will generally be more trusting of political institutions (Mishler and Rose, 2001).  Finally, non-
voters  and  those  having  cast  their  votes  for  opposition  parties  display  lower  levels  of 
institutional trust than election winners (Anderson and Tverdova, 2003).  As for the country-
level controls, most of these fail to reach conventional standards of statistical significance.  We 
do note, however, that citizens of Central and Eastern European countries report lower levels 
of  institutional  trust  than  those  of  Western  European  countries  even  after  controlling  for 
corruption and macro-economic performance.  
 
INSERT TABLE 1 
 
Under  which  conditions  can  we  expect  a  positive  or  negative  impact  of  education  on 
institutional  trust?    The  results  of  Table  1  show  that  education  is  negatively  related  to   16
institutional trust when the Corruption Perception Index is zero.  Thus in the hypothetical case 
of a perfectly corrupt society the most educated are less politically trusting than the least 
educated (1.59 points less trusting to be exact).  The interaction terms reveal that this gap 
decreases as the CPI increases.  In a perfectly clean society (CPI = 10), the highest educated 
are estimated to be more trusting of political institutions than the lowest educated by 0.83 
points.  Of course, CPI values of 0 and 10 do not really exist.  In the real-world settings of our 
sample of countries, the CPI runs from 3.8 in Romania to 9.3 in Denmark and Sweden.  Using 
the estimates from our model, Figure 2 charts the marginal effect of education on institutional 
trust for different values of the CPI.
9  Education is negatively related to institutional trust for 
countries whose CPI is lower than 6.1 (which includes the Czech Republic, Croatia, Greece, 
Hungary, Latvia, Poland, Portugal, and Romania).  The effect of education on institutional 
trust is non-significant if the CPI lies above 6.1 and below 7.0 (a range that covers Estonia, 
France, Slovenia, and Spain).  Finally, education has a positive effect on institutional trust for 
countries whose CPI exceeds 7.0 (encompassing Belgium, Denmark, Finland, Germany, Great 
Britain, the Netherlands, Norway, Sweden, and Switzerland). 
 
INSERT FIGURE 2 
 
In line with Hypothesis 1, in relatively corrupt societies the most educated are more distrustful 
than the least educated, in moderately clean societies they are equally trusting as the least 
educated, and in relatively clean societies they are more trusting.  By explicitly modeling the 
possibility that corruption and education interact, we are able to isolate the conditions under 
which education has a positive, non-significant, and negative effect on institutional trust and, 
in so doing, we are able to resolve the inconsistency of the effects of education as reported in 
previous research (see Table A1 in the online appendix). 
                                                 
9 We made use of the STATA syntax that accompanies Brambor et al., 2006.   17
Next, we deal with the conditioning effect of education as formulated in Hypothesis 2.  The 
coefficient for corruption in Table 1 captures the effect of corruption on institutional trust for 
the group with the lowest level of educational attainment.  These are respondents who have not 
completed primary education or who have obtained a qualification at the primary or first stage 
of  basic  education.    Corruption  does  not  seem  to  affect  the  institutional  trust  of  the  least 
educated  cohorts,  controlling  for  a  host  of  relevant  individual-level  and  country-level 
characteristics.    While  the  coefficient  has  the  expected  sign  –  the  higher  the  Corruption 
Perception Index, the higher institutional trust – it fails to reach accepted levels of statistical 
significance.  However, corruption has a statistically significant effect on the institutional trust 
of all other education groups.  This leads us to conclude that corruption has a corrosive impact 
on trust in political institutions for all but the lowest-education cohorts, and that this corrosive 
effect increases as citizens attain higher levels of education. 
 
INSERT FIGURE 3 
 
Figure 3 summarizes our statistical analyses by calculating the predicted levels of institutional 
trust across education groups and levels of corruption.  By keeping all other variables in Model 
1 at their mean or mode we can determine the effect of education alone on institutional trust at 
various values of the Corruption Perception Index.  It is clear from this figure that the most 
educated  trust  or  distrust  political  institutions  based  on  the  overall  performance  of  their 
political system.  Institutional trust among the most educated covaries strongly alongside the 
Corruption Perception Index.  The difference in institutional trust between two highly educated 
individuals, one from Sweden and the other from Romania, is approximately 2.0 points on a 0-
10 scale.  By contrast, the same difference is approximately less than half a point for the least 
educated.    Given  that  the  results  reported  in  Table  1  indicate  that  this  difference  is  not   18
statistically  significant  at  the  .05  level,  we  cannot  reliably  infer  that  corruption  affects 
institutional trust among citizens with the lowest levels of education. 
Conclusion 
This study examines the context-specific effects of education on institutional trust.  The theory 
that we test was developed around the following two propositions.  First, citizens grant or 
withhold trust as a way of evaluating political institutions for their performance.  Second, 
citizens with more education are not only more likely to be better able to identify practices that 
undermine the smooth functioning of democratic institutions, they are also more likely to be 
normatively troubled by such practices.  In line with our expectations we find that the direction 
and magnitude of the effect of education is conditional upon the pervasiveness of public-sector 
corruption: in countries with low levels of corruption education boosts institutional trust; in 
countries with comparatively high levels of corruption education dampens institutional trust.  
In addition, our  analyses  largely support  our hypothesis  that education also  moderates the 
effect of corruption on institutional trust.  Specifically, we find that the corrosive effect of 
corruption  on  political trust  worsens  as  education  improves  (except for  the least educated 
whose trust in political institutions we find is unaffected by corruption). 
The results of our analyses have implications not just for future comparative research on the 
causes of public opinion and the attitudinal effects of political corruption but also for better 
understanding the functioning of democracy.  In the literature that has emerged on corruption 
over the past twenty years one of the clearest and most consistent findings is that corruption 
undermines  people’s  trust  and  confidence  in  the  actors  and  institutions  of  democratic 
government.    Thus  far,  almost  all  of  this  research  has  focused  on  the  direct  effects  of 
corruption on political support.  In line however with a few other existing pieces (Anderson 
and Tverdova, 2003; Herreros and Criado, 2007), our study underscores the importance of 
developing and testing theories that elucidate the conditional nature of the attitudinal (as well   19
as the behavioral) consequences of corruption.  Moreover, our finding that corruption fails to 
impact the institutional trust of the least educated points to the need for additional scholarship 
on the micro- and/or macro-conditions under which corruption and other forms of systemic 
dysfunctionality become, worryingly from a democratic point of view, politically irrelevant for 
specific groups of citizens. 
Despite a long tradition of work emphasizing the links between educational achievement 
and democratic commitment, scholars of political behavior exploring the interactive effects of 
education have to date focused their attention on the knowledge-enhancing, accuracy-inducing 
functions of education.  A key contribution of the present study is that it incorporates the 
normative dimensions of education when theorizing about the conditional and conditioning 
effects of education on public opinion.  In elaborating our hypotheses in a way that is sensitive 
to both the cognitive and the moral properties of education, the results of our analyses strongly 
support a “rationalist” understanding of institutional trust.  Citizens with comparable levels of 
education systematically express different levels of political trust depending on the overall 
performance of their particular country’s political system.  This clearly suggests that rather 
than  being  something  fixed  and  deeply  culturally  embedded  trust  is  generated  through  a 
process that is fundamentally evaluative in nature.  As such, our findings warn against viewing 
societies that express high levels of institutional trust in the aggregate as either politically 
docile or lacking the skepticism necessary for democratic maturity, or indeed assuming that 
countries with low aggregate levels of political trust are doomed in perpetuity. 
Finally,  the  findings  of  our  analyses  point  to  some  important  potential  political 
consequences arising from the changing educational profile of many of today’s middle- and 
high-income  democracies.    In  recent  decades,  and  as  a  response  to  the  demands  and 
insecurities  arising  from  economic  globalization,  governments  across  the  world  have 
increasingly been pursuing policies aimed at promoting a knowledge-based economic model.  
A key component of these policies has been to invest heavily in raising educational standards.    20
For  example,  across  OECD  member  countries  completion  rates  of  undergraduate  degree 
programs rose by 21 percentage points between 1995 and 2008 (OECD, 2010, p. 61).  Such 
rapidly increasing aggregate levels of education have particularly challenging consequences 
where levels of corruption are high.  As several of the countries in our sample attest, rooting 
out  corruption  can  prove  very  difficult.    After  two  decades  of  democratic  rule  corruption 
remains relatively high in a number of Central and Eastern European countries; the same is 
equally true of Greece, for example, which has enjoyed democracy for even longer.  Given this 
contrast  between,  on  the  one  hand,  the  speed with  which  educational standards  are  rising 
across the democracies from which our sample of countries is drawn and, on the other hand, 
the slow pace at which political authorities are able or willing to stamp out corrupt practices, 
our  findings  suggest  that  the  problem  of  low-level  institutional  trust  in  contexts  of  high 
corruption  is  likely  only  to  worsen  in  the  medium  term.    In  and  of  itself  this  potential 
development  is  normatively  troubling.    In  addition  however,  as  noted  earlier  existing 
comparative research shows that persistently low levels of institutional trust can have serious 
ramifications  for  state-society  relations  in  these  democracies.    Possible  effects  include 
increasing levels of protest, political apathy and disengagement from formal, electoral politics, 
an upturn in voting for anti-system parties, diminishing support for redistributive government 
action  aimed at tackling socio-economic inequalities, and higher levels of  non-compliance 
with government regulations.   21
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Table 1: Effects of education and corruption on institutional trust 
Independent variable  Estimate  (Std. Error) 
 
Main variables of interest 
Education  
  (Reference: not completed and basic)  
  Lower secondary 
  Upper and post secondary 
  BA and higher 
 
 
 
 
– 0.100*** 
– 1.292*** 
– 1.587*** 
 
 
 
 
(0.172) 
(0.148) 
(0.201) 
Corruption  0.093  (0.060) 
Corruption × Lower secondary  0.145***  (0.025) 
Corruption × Upper and post secondary  0.189***  (0.022) 
Corruption × BA and higher  0.242***  (0.029) 
 
Individual-level controls 
   
Male  – 0.021  (0.019) 
Age  – 0.029***  (0.003) 
Age
2 / 1000  0.267***  (0.030) 
Father’s education  0.022*  (0.008) 
Religious adherence  0.170***  (0.023) 
Attendance of religious services  0.063***  (0.008) 
Income  0.022***  (0.004) 
Election winner-loser status 
  (Reference: winner) 
  Loser 
  Nonvoter 
 
 
– 0.298*** 
– 0.463*** 
 
 
(0.022) 
(0.026) 
Social trust  0.184***  (0.004) 
Satisfaction with the economy  0.290***  (0.005) 
 
Country-level controls 
   
GDP per capita / 1000  – 0.017  (0.014) 
Unemployment  – 0.048  (0.037) 
Central and Eastern Europe  – 0.533*  (0.225) 
Disproportionality of the electoral system  0.009  (0.015) 
     
Intercept  3.080***  (0.718) 
 
Random effects 
Variance (Country) 
 
 
0.053** 
 
 
 
Variance (BA and higher)  0.023   
Variance (Upper and post secondary)  0.005   
Variance (Lower secondary)  0.009   
Variance (Individual)  2.353***   
N (Individuals)  27,785   
N (Countries)  21   
–2 × Log Likelihood  102737   
Note:  *** p < .001, ** p < .01, * p < .05. Two-tailed tests of statistical significance 
Source:  European Social Survey, Round 4. 
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